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RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0106  
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2378  
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0732  
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3621  
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 5994  
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 3751  
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 5047  
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0703  
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1603  
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA 1234  
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0322  
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 9639  
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 4119  
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SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT, NEA/RA AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2018

TAGS: [PTER](#) [FAIR](#) [PREL](#) [MO](#)

SUBJECT: MOROCCAN EFFORTS TO STOP THE FLOW OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS

REF: A. STATE 050900 (NOTAL)  
[1](#)B. STATE 037910 (NOTAL)  
[1](#)C. RABAT 0422  
[1](#)D. RABAT 0400  
[1](#)E. RABAT 0398  
[1](#)F. RABAT 0150

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for reasons 1.4 (b), (c) and (d).

[1](#)1. (S/NF) Summary: The Mission has followed up with appropriate Moroccan officials regarding the flow of foreign fighters (FF) to Iraq (Ref A) and determined that the Moroccan security services are actively engaged in preventing FF from leaving the country. Morocco is well aware that the USG considers the elimination of foreign fighters a priority for building peace and stability in Iraq, and Moroccan security officials support USG efforts to reach out to source countries to stem the flow of FF. The Kingdom's motivation to detain those citizens intent on fighting in Iraq is primarily based on self-interest. The Moroccan services are concerned that FF who return from Iraq are likely to be battle-hardened and ready to commit terrorist acts in Morocco. Moroccan authorities effectively monitor the movement and activities of extremists and have prevented over 139 Moroccan fighters from traveling to Iraq since 2003 (Ref F), including approximately 40 between late 2006 and early [1](#)2008. End summary.

[1](#)2. (S/NF) Prior to the release of the Objective Massey data, Moroccan security officials had identified some 15 suicide bombers who had left Morocco for jihad in Iraq. The Objective Massey documents enabled Moroccan officials to confirm these individuals had reached Iraq, and Morocco launched a full-scale investigation into the names listed in the Massey files. The Moroccan services have used the information recovered by U.S. forces to investigate associates of the Abu Ghadiya foreign fighter facilitation

network who are involved in the movement of Moroccan fighters to and from Iraq.

¶3. (S/NF) Moroccan security services, relations with the Syrian services are improving, particularly in regard to foreign fighter issues. The security services have noted that the Syrian government has detained several Moroccan foreign fighters traveling through Syria en route to Iraq and has cooperated in extraditing them back to Morocco. Moroccan officials have stated, however, that Syrian cooperation is dependent on whether the Syrians perceive it to be in their national interest. The Moroccans are aware that the Syrians knowingly allow foreign fighters to cross through Syria, but the security services try to provide the Syrians complete dossiers on such Moroccans en route to Iraq to facilitate Syrian detention.

¶4. (S/NF) The Moroccan Government is aware of the potential danger represented by foreign fighters going to Iraq and subsequently returning to the Kingdom to commit a terrorist act. The security services, which are actively detaining jihadists and investigating new leads on foreign fighter cells, have a proven track record in wrapping up FF cells and individuals. The services in December 2006 dismantled a major foreign fighter facilitation network and passed information that led to the arrest in Sweden of the cell's leader, al-Qa,ida member and Moroccan national Abdelali Miftah; they arrested in March 2007 Sa,ad al-Husayni, a Moroccan Islamic Fighting Group (GICM) military wing commander who had facilitated the travel of jihadists to

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Iraq; and they helped target Moroccan al-Qa,ida in Iraq extremist Muhsin Khaybar, a jihadist facilitator recruiting foreign fighters from North Africa and Europe, who was eventually killed by U.S. forces in Iraq. Early in May 2008 another FF cell of 11 was arrested. The GOM has announced that all such investigations, arrests, prosecutions and detentions will be in accord with the rule of law and human rights standards prevailing in the country. As far as we know, in recent times, it has generally fulfilled this commitment, and even terrorists who are arrested get their day in court.

¶5. (S/NF) Intelligence collection on FF issues is of high importance to the Moroccan Government, and the services are engaged. In an effort to enhance domestic intelligence collection, the Government in April 2008 implemented the new biometric enabled National Identification Card which will help the Government better track suspected terrorists. The National Police are also establishing guidelines for a future Moroccan biometric passport. In addition, Morocco,s Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Endowments closely supervises the country,s mosques and monitors speeches given by local religious leaders to ensure they are promoting a tolerant, moderate interpretation of Islam. Moroccan intelligence sharing on foreign fighter pipeline issues with other North African partners is good, but longstanding regional disputes have hindered cooperation with Algeria.

¶6. (S/NF) Concerning air travel to Syria, Turkey and other countries bordering Iraq (Ref B), the Ambassador met with the President of Royal Air Maroc to brief him and seek his cooperation. Other mission officers have followed up with counterparts on sharing airline passenger manifests. The GOM is prepared to pursue the idea in principle. However, the Mission understands that Morocco is not currently a priority country in spite of the growing volume of passengers, including passengers in transit.

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Riley